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Defending Hospital Mergers After the FTC's
Unorthodox Challenge to the Evanston
Northwestern - Highland Park Transaction
Tom Campbell*
The Federal Trade Commission's ("FTC's") retrospective challenge to
the merger of Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Corporation ("ENH") and
Highland Park Hospital ("HPH") stands out as one of the agency's major
antitrust enforcement initiatives in health care over the last several years.
Tried before an FTC Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") in 2005, the case
produced several departures from antitrust orthodoxy. This article explores
how these departures may affect the trials of future hospital mergers that are
challenged.
THE MURIS MISSION

The goal of this prosecution was to reassert the agency's authority to
challenge hospital mergers that threaten competition and to validate new
approaches the agency devised to analyze the competitive effects of a
merger. The usual justification for a hospital merger challenge is that Managed Care Organizations ("MCOs"), such as Health Maintenance Organizations ("HMOs"), will no longer be able to obtain competitive bids when two
hospitals merge. However, the theory that prices will inexorably rise and
consumers will be injured has not always carried the day when hospital
mergers have been challenged and put to the test in a courtroom. On November 7, 2002, after the FTC and Department of Justice ("DOJ") lost
seven straight hospital merger challenges,1 the FTC Chairman at the time,
Tom Campbell is a partner in Baker & McKenzie LLP's Chicago office where he specializes in the litigation of antitrust matters and business disputes. Mr. Campbell frequently
writes and speaks on antitrust developments. This paper is based in part on a presentation
made to the Illinois Association of Healthcare Attorneys 2 4 h Annual Health Law Symposium, held at the Chicago Marriott Downtown, October 4, 2006. The author thanks Roxane
Busey and William J. Lynk for helpful comments.
1. In re Adventist Health Sys., 117 F.T.C. 224 (1994) (where the author was counsel of
record, at trial and on appeal); FTC v. Freeman Hosp., 1995 MO W.D. 71,037, 911 F. Supp.
1213 (W.D. Mo. 1995), affd, 69 F.3d 260 (8th Cir. 1995) (where the author was counsel of
record, at trial and on appeal); FTC v. Tenet Health Care Corp., 186 F.3d 1045 (8th Cir.
1999); United States v. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 983 F. Supp. 121 (E.D.N.Y. 1997);
*
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Tim Muris, announced that the FTC was conducting a retrospective study
of consummated hospital mergers and developing a task force to screen
merger case targets and develop new theories for trying them.2
The transaction chosen to improve the enforcement record was the
merger of ENH and HPH, a surprising choice considering the FTC staff had
many consummated hospital mergers from which to choose and the structural argument was not compelling: after all, Chicago and its suburbs are
rife with hospitals. 3 The FTC and DOJ agencies have previously been unsuccessful in less populated areas where there are fewer hospitals. 4 However, the ENH transaction did provide a record showing that the merged
hospital raised prices after the merger, a troublesome fact supporting an inference of competitive injury that would prove difficult to rebut. The FTC
Complaint Counsel succeeded in persuading the FTC ALJ that the merger
was anticompetitive and that he should order a divestiture.6 However, the
proof relied on to compel that result departed from previously accepted
standards in a number of ways, as did the theory of how competition would
be injured. In a bizarre twist, the ALJ grounded his decision on the structural case, not on the proof offered to show direct anticompetitive effects:
the price increases. 7
Commentators have criticized the Initial Decision of the ALJ condemning the merger, issued on October 20, 2005,8 for being unconvincing and
analytically flawed. 9 That decision has been appealed to the full CommisFTC v. Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. 1285 (W.D. Mich. 1996), affd, 121 F.3d 708
(6th Cir. 1997); United States v. Mercy Health Sen's., 902 F. Supp. 968 (N.D. Iowa 1995),
vacated as moot, 107 F.3d 632 (8th Cir. 1997); California v. Sutter Health Sys., 130 F. Supp.
2d 1109 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
2. Timothy J. Muris, FTC Chairman, Everything Old is New Again: Health Care and
Competition in the 21 s"Century, Remarks Before the Seventh Annual Competition in Health
Care Forum (November 7, 2002), at 19,
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/muris/murishealthcarespeech0211 .pdf.
3. John T. Cusack, L. Edward Bryant & Steven S. Shonder, A Dose of Bad Medicine:
The FederalTrade Commission'sAttempt to Break Up Evanston Northwestern Healthcare,

32 J. HEALTH CARE FIN. 1 app. a at 32-36 (2006).
4.

See Adventist Health Sys., 117 F.T.C. at 242, 247; FreemanHosp., 911 F. Supp. at

1217; Tenet Health Care Corp., 186 F.3d at 1047; Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. at
1288; Mercy Health Serv., 902 F. Supp. at 971.
5. Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Corp., F.T.C. No. 9315 at 200 (Oct. 20, 2005)
(initial decision), http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9315/051020initialdecision.pdf [hereinafter
Initial Decision].
6. 1d. at 206.
7. See id. at 200-01.
8. Id. at 255.
9. See Barry C. Harris & David A. Argue, FTC v. Evanston Northwestern: A Change
from TraditionalHospitalMergerAnalysis?, Antitrust Magazine, Spring 2006, at 34, 35;
Cusack et al., supra note 3.
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sion' ° and has been briefed and argued." As of the date of this article's
publication, the Commission has not yet issued a decision.' 2 Moreover, after the Commission issues a decision, there may still be an appeal to one of
the United States Courts of Appeals. 13 Nevertheless, the novel approaches
used in prosecuting this case will undoubtedly remain weapons in the arsenal of the enforcers and will be employed again in future prosecutions,
making it timely to consider how to deal with these approaches now.
THE CONVENTIONAL/UNCONVENTIONAL COMBO

In 1999, ENH consisted of Evanston Hospital, which had 411 staffed
beds, and Glenbrook Hospital, which had 143.'4 ENH merged with HPH,
which had 157 beds.' 5 The transaction was not challenged at the time.
ENH and HPH had been part of the Northwestern Healthcare Network,
which had received clearance under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act in 1993.16
Prior to consummating their merger on January 1, 2000, ENH and HPH
confirmed with the FTC Pre-Merger Notification Office that they did not
merger because
need to seek additional clearance under the Act for their
7
they were already deemed to be under common control.'
The FTC filed its challenge to the merger in 2004.18 The case was tried
before an ALJ who issued his Initial Decision on October 20, 2005.19 The
parties argued the appeal to the full Commission on May 17, 2006.20
The FTC's Complaint consisted of two primary theories as to why the
10. Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Corp., Notice of Appeal, F.T.C. No. 9315 (Oct.
26, 2005) (notice of appeal), http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9315/051026enhnotofappeal.pdf.
11. Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Corp., F.T.C. No. 9315 (Dec. 20, 2005) (respondent's appellate brief), http://www.fc.gov/os/adjpro/d9315/051220enhappealbrief.pdf;
Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Corp., F.T.C. No. 9315 (Feb. 10, 2006) (answer and
cross appeal), http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9315/060210ccattachmntpursuantrule.pdf.
No.
9315,
F.T.C.,
Corp.
Healthcare
Northwestern
12. See Evanston
http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9315/index.htm (for most recent status of this case).
13. Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(c) (2000).
14. Initial Decision, supra note 5, at 5-6.
15. Id. at 7, 14.
16. Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18a (2000); Evanston
Northwestern Healthcare Corp., F.T.C. No. 9315 at 85-86 (Jan. 12, 2006) (respondent's corhttp://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9315/
brief),
appeal
rected
060112enhappealbriefcorrected.pdf.

17.
18.

See id. at 197.
Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Corp., F.T.C. No. 9315 (Feb. 10, 2004) (admin.

compl.), http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0110234/040210emhcomplaint.pdf [hereinafter Administrative Complaint].

19. Initial Decision, supra note 5.
20. Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Corp., F.T.C. No. 9315 (April 20, 2006) (notice
scheduling oral argument), http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9315/060420notschedoralargu.
pdf.
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transaction was illegal. 2 1 Although Count One of the Complaint used a
conventional approach, Count Two of the Complaint was novel.
The
conventional approach is to demonstrate that a transaction will lead to undue concentration in the market for a particular product in a particular geographic area, which supports an inference that the transaction will substantially lessen competition.23 According to the FTC Merger Guidelines, that
lessening of competition can occur in one of two ways: (1) facilitating collusion among the remaining competitors ("coordinated effects") or (2) exercising market power by a single firm .("unilateral effects").24 At trial, if the
government shows the requisite undue concentration, then the burden shifts
to the defendant to rebut the inference that the transaction will injure competition. 25 Thus, the conventional approach focuses on the structure of the
market.
In Count One, the Complaint alleged that the product market was inpatient acute care hospital services "sold to private payers. 2 6 This was a narrower product market than those used in prior hospital merger cases, which
typically included all inpatient services (i.e., including services reimbursed
by Medicare).27 In fact, the Complaint narrowed the product market even
further by alleging that it excluded "tertiary" services (e.g., sophisticated
services provided by highly specialized providers such as open heart surgery and transplants).28 The scope of the product market affects the size of
the geographic market, and a market including tertiary services would be
larger than one excluding these services. By eliminating tertiary care from
the product market definition, the Complaint Counsel could argue for a narrower geographic market that, as the discussion below shows, would increase the FTC's chances of success. However, Complaint Counsel ulti

21.
Administrative Complaint, supra note 18, at 3-7.
22.
Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Corp., F.T.C. No. 9315 at 1-2 (May 17, 2005)
(decision and order), http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9315/050520do.pdf.
23. United States v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 908 F.2d 981, 982 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
24. FTC Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 41552, 41558, 41560 (Sept. 10,
1992) [hereinafter Merger Guidelines]; see Baker, 908 F.2d at 983.
25. Baker, 908 F.2d at 983.
26. Administrative Complaint, supra note 18, at 3.
27. In re Adventist Health Sys., 117 F.T.C. 224, 278 (1994) (observing that FTC complaint counsel proposed a product market of inpatient acute hospital care, which was the
product market found by the ALI, and that that product market conformed to the decisions in
FTC v. Univ. Health Sys., 938 F.2d 1206, 1210-11 (11 th Cir. 1991); United States v. Rockford Mem. Hosp. Corp., 898 F.2d 1278 (7th Cir. 1990); Hosp. Corp. of America, 106 F.T.C.
361, 464-66 (1985), affid, Hosp. Corp. of America v. FTC, 807 F.2d 1381 (7th Cir. 1986));
see also FTC v. Freeman Hosp., 69 F.3d 260, 268 (W.D. Mo. 1995), and California v. Sutter
Health Sys., 130 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1119 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
28.
Administrative Complaint, supra note 18, at 3-7.
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mately did include tertiary services at trial and the validity of the product
market definition used in the Complaint was not litigated.29
The geographic market consisted of an area fifteen miles long (running
north-south along Lake Michigan) and ten miles wide. The Complaint alleged that the resulting relevant market was highly concentrated and that the
post-merger firm produced an impermissible level of concentration as
measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index ("HHI"). 30 HHI is a measure
of market share concentration and is computed by adding up the square of
each market participant's market share. 3' HHI below 1000 reflects a market
characterized as unconcentrated, HHI between 1000 and 1800 reflects a
market characterized as moderately concentrated, and HHI above 1800 reflects a market characterized as highly concentrated.3 2 Under the Merger
Guidelines, the agencies look at the increase in concentration caused by the
merger. 33 If the delta, or increase, is less than 100 points in moderately
concentrated markets, the merger is presumed to not have adverse competitive consequences. 34 Mergers that potentially raise competitive concerns
and may be challenged include mergers in moderately concentrated markets
that result in an increase of 100 points or more, and mergers in highly concentrated markets that result in an increase of fifty points, depending on certain other factors. 35 By comparison, the Complaint in the present case alleged an increase of 500 in the HHI to a level above 3000.36 That being
said, the standards described in the Merger Guidelines are not a very reliable gauge for when the agencies will challenge a merger or when a merger
the agencies have deviated
will be found illegal. More cases exist in which
37
them.
followed
than
rather
from the standards
Count Two focused on conduct: the increase in prices post-merger. This
arguably showed actual anticompetitive effects. The FTC probably brought
the case because ENH's administrators had riled MCOs; in fact, the FTC's
investigation uncovered statements in internal reports that ENH's ability to
increase prices to MCOs was made possible by the merger. 38 At trial,
29. See Initial Decision, supra note 5, at 135.
30. Merger Guidelines, supra note 24, at 41558; Administrative Complaint, supra note
18, at 4 (noting an increase of more than 500 to a level exceeding 3000 on the HHI index).
31. Merger Guidelines, supra note 24, at 41558.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Administrative Complaint, supra note 18, at 4.
37. See Merger Guidelines, supra note 24, at 41562.
38. Initial Decision, supra note 5, at 47-5 1.
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Complaint Counsel showed that the leaders of the hospitals planning the
merger saw it as an opportunity "to strengthen negotiation capability," "to
join forces rather than39compete with each other," and to build "negotiating
strength with payers."
The FTC was able to focus on post-merger price increases and assert the
unconventional approach that evidence of actual anticompetitive effects existed because the case was a rare retrospectivechallenge to a merger.40 Under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act ("HSR Act"), parties to a merger of requisite
size must file a pre-merger notification form and observe a "waiting period"
after which they are free to consummate the merger if the agencies determine not to challenge.4 1 The HSR Act has had the effect of making most
merger challenges prospective.4 2 In fact, one reason why the HSR Act
passed was because the business community objected to the uncertainty of
the pre-HSR Act days, when mergers were routinely challenged retrospectively.4 3 Thus, the conventional proof to show illegality is the structural
analysis of the market discussed above and typically there is no direct evidence of anticompetitive effects.
CHANGING THE ANALYTICAL TOOLS

The prosecution of the ENH merger was intended not only to break the
agencies' track record of losing seven straight hospital merger challenges,
but it was also aimed at validating changes the agencies have promoted regarding how mergers in the healthcare field should be analyzed in the future. For example, in 2004, following twenty-seven days of joint hearings,
the DOJ and FTC issued a report entitled Improving Health Care: A Dose
of Competition.44 The Report did not produce case studies of past mergers.4 5 Instead, it offered criticisms of the traditional analytical tools, suggested that some traditional tools should not be used, and set the stage for
some of the approaches used in the retrospective challenge to the ENHHPH merger. The Report signaled the attempt to use new theories to sup-

39. Id.at 44.
40. Id. at 138.
41. 15 U.S.C. § 18a (2000).
42. See generally 43 Fed. Reg. 33,450 (1978), 44 Fed. Reg. 66,781 (1979), and 45 Fed.
Reg. 14,205 (1980).
43. STAFF OF THE BUREAU OF COMPETITION, F.T.C., A STUDY OF THE COMMISSION'S
DIVESTITURE PROCESS 1-4 (1999).
44.

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION AND DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, IMPROVING HEALTH

CARE: A DOSE OF COMPETITION (July 2004), availableat

http://www.ftc.gov/reports/healthcare/040723healthcarept.pdf [hereinafter A DOSE OF
COMPETITION].

45.

See id.
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port hospital merger prosecutions. 46 Both the Report and the filing of FTC
v. ENH were initiatives taken by the FTC during Chairman Muris's tenure.47

In analyzing the hospital merger cases that the agencies had lost, the
agencies generally did not encounter any difficulty having courts accept
their proposed product market definitions. 48 However, their proposed geographic market definitions were more problematic. A number of challenges
to hospital mergers were rejected based on the government's failure to identify a properly defined geographic market.4 9
The geographic market is one of the three elements that must be established to prove that a merger is anticompetitive. 50 The other two are the
product market and the requisite anticompetitive effect. 5 1 These elements
come straight out of the statute. 52 Section 7 of the Clayton Act makes an
acquisition illegal where:
In any line of commerce or in any activity affecting commerce in any
section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may
53 be substantially
to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.
The "section of the country" is the geographic market, the "line of commerce" is the product market, and the "effect" is the competitive effect of
the transaction. However, the statute does not explain how geographic
markets should be determined, and geographic market analysis has evolved
slowly as better analytical tools have been developed.
The Supreme Court has held that a geographic market should describe
"the area of effective competition ...in which the seller operates, and to
which the purchaser can practicably turn for supplies., 54 One method developed to identify
that area was economic analysis using the "Elzinga55
Hogarty" test.
46.

Id. at 4-5.

47.

Id.; see F.T.C., COMMISSIONERS AND CHAIRMEN OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

(2006), http://www.ftc.gov/ftc/history/06commisionerchartlegal.pdf.
48. But see United States v. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 983 F. Supp. 121 (E.D.N.Y.
1997) (rejecting the product market proposed by the Department of Justice).
49. Initial Decision, supra note 5, at 137.
50. Id. at 131.
51.

Id.

52. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2000).
53. Id.
54. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 359 (1963) (quoting Tampa
Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 399 U.S. 320, 327 (1961)); see generally Merger Guidelines, supra note 24.
55. See generally Kenneth G. Elzinga & Thomas F. Hogarty, The Problem of GeographicMarket Delineationin Antimerger Suits, 18 ANTITRUST BULL. 45 (1973) [hereinafter

GeographicMarket Delineation];see also Kenneth G. Elzinga & Thomas F. Hogarty, The
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THE LOGIC OF THE ELZINGA-HOGARTY TEST

The Elzinga-Hogarty test, when applied to hospital mergers, examines
patient origin data to determine where the patients admitted to the merging
hospitals came from and where people living in or near that same area went
when they sought hospitalization at hospitals other than the merging hospitals. The test utilizes two numerical measures which the authors dubbed
LOFI ("little out from inside") and LIFO ("little in from outside").56
The LOFI area can be determined by taking the two merging hospitals'
patient origin data and ranking that data by zip code in descending order
from most populous (in terms of patient volume to the hospitals) to least.57
Those zip codes can then be assembled in a compact and contiguous array
to account for various levels of the patient population. The LOFI step identifies what is often referred to as the hospitals' service area.
The second step, the LIFO measure, seeks to identify where residents living within the service area go when they seek hospitalization at hospitals
other than the merging ones. 8 While the first step relies on data from the
merging hospitals that obtain home addresses when patients are admitted,
this second step requires data from hospitals other than the two merging.
State hospital associations often compile these data. This second step identifies the competing hospitals that residents of the service area go to when
they do not go to one of the merging hospitals. Those hospitals attracting
significant numbers of patients from the service area should probably be included in the relevant market. Thus, the relevant geographic market will
usually be an area larger than the merging hospitals' service area. It also
can be described by referring to the hospitals identified in the second step
rather than to the zip codes of their respective service areas.
The logic behind the LOFI determination is that a LOFI of 100% for an
area would indicate that all the patients going to the two hospitals reside in
the area identified. Symmetrically, a LIFO of 100% would mean that all of
the residents of the proposed area seek hospitalization within the area described. The authors of the test originally recommended using a 75% cutoff for the LOFI and LIFO calculations to define the geographic market. In
other words, in the hospital setting, the exercise of assembling zip codes reflecting patients admitted to a hospital in the LOFI step would be satisfied
once 75% of the hospitals' admissions were accounted for, and the geographic market would include the competing hospitals that account for 75%
Problem of GeographicMarket DelineationRevisited: The Case of Coal, 23 ANTITRUST
BULL. 1 (1978).
56. GeographicMarket Delineation,supra note 55, at 57-59.
57. Id. at 58-59.
58. Id.
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of the people seeking hospitalization from the LOFI area. However, in their
subsequent article the authors expressed a preference for a 90% cut-off.
The results from using these two standards are sometimes referred to as
producing a "weak market," i.e., one employing the 75% standard, or a
"strong market," one employing the 90% standard.
The FTC's Complaint Counsel relied on this test in the Ukiah case,
which was a hospital merger case similar to the ENH case because it was
also a retrospective challenge to a merger. 59 In Ukiah, while the Commission did not endorse the use of either the 75% or 90% threshold to define a
market, the Commission held that Complaint Counsel failed to carry their
burden of proof when they relied on a geographic market that was based on
a LOFI statistic of only 74.57%.60
The difference between the 75-75 or 90-90 cut-off is critically important.
The so-called "weaker" market would implicate a smaller geographic market, which, in turn, would increase the market shares of the merging hospitals and raise the HHIs. Thus, if 75-75 were the standard, then it would
tend to make more mergers look illegal under the government's Merger
Guidelines.
SHOOT THE MESSENGER

Unable to use the Elzinga-Hogarty test effectively to win hospital merger
cases, the agencies set about to attack the test's validity. In the July 2004
"Dose of Competition" Report, the agencies observed that "hospital markets should be defined properly," explaining:
To date, the Agencies' experience and research indicate that the Elzingaor reliable in defining geographic markets in
Hogarty test is not valid
61
hospitals merger cases.
The Report further summarized the testimony of the test's critics, who were
invited to speak at the hearings sponsored by the agencies.62 The critics
suggested that
* the test produced "implausibly large geographic markets";

59. In re Adventist Health Sys./West, 117 F.T.C. 224, 224 (1994).
60. Id. at 294-97.
61. A DOSE OF COMPETITION, supra note 44, at 26.
62. The Dose Of Competition Report cited certain commentators and the presentations
of individuals who were invited to be panelists in the hearings held by the DOJ and FTC.
Those whose comments were reported as being critical of the Elzinga-Hogarty test were:
Gregory Vistnes, H.E. Frech, III, Thomas L. Greaney, Jack Zwanziger, Cory S. Capps,
David Dranove, Shane Greenstein, and Mark Satherwaite.
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e because the test was designed to identify markets for homogenous goods, it should not be applied to "heterogeneous goods or
differentiated products," such as the goods and services provided
by hospitals; and
* the test draws a conclusion from the behavior of a small number
of patients who travel, and therefore
63 may not accurately reflect the
behavior of the "silent majority."
In the FTC v. ENH trial, Complaint Counsel sought to give the ElzingaHogarty test the coup de grice by retaining none other than Ken Elzinga, an
author of the test, to testify that, in his expert opinion, his test should not be
applied to hospital mergers. 64 Elzinga testified that his test has a "fundamental flaw" because of the "silent majority fallacy. 65 He went on to explain that the silent majority fallacy is the assumption that, while some patients currently go to a distant hospital, if prices were to go up, then an even
larger number of patients would travel to distant hospitals.66 This freed
Complaint Counsel to ignore the empirical data that reflected where patients
go when they proposed a geographic market to meet their burden in Count
One's structural challenge. For good measure, Elzinga also said that defining a geographic market was not necessary where there was persuasive
post-merger evidence of the consequences of a merger and that the "payer
problem" also made the Elzinga-Hogarty test "less useful. 67 This cleared
the way for Complaint Counsel to sidestep defining the relevant market in
meeting their burden of proof in Count Two.
THE DIVIDENDS

All of this investment in creating a more enforcement-friendly world
paid off when the ALJ,in his Initial Decision, made the following findings:
216. Patient-flow data and the Elzinga-Hogarty test are inapplicable to
geographic market definition for a differentiated product such as hospital
services.

A DOSE OF COMPETITION, supra note 44, at ch. 4, 4-7.
64. FTC v. ENH, Tr. May 25, 2005 at 2342-418.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp.2d 1098, 1161-65 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (rejecting testimony from Elzinga himself that the Elzinga-Hogarty test was inapplicable); see
also California v. Sutter Health Sys. 84 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1069 (N.D. Cal. 2000), and United
States v. Mercy Health Servs., 902 F. Supp. 968, 980 (N.D. Iowa 1995) (establishing a basis
for the Oracle court to reject Elzinga's testimony that the Elzinga-Hogarty test was inapplicable).
63.
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A "silent majority" of people will not travel in response to a

change in hospital prices, and those people can be subject to an anticompetitive price increase.
222. However, basing geographic market definition on patient migration
and patient flow data inherently
68 will overstate the size of the geographic
market for hospital services.
The ALJ based each of these findings on Elzinga's testimony. Unfortunately, the effort to gut the Elzinga-Hogarty test went unchallenged by
counsel for ENH at trial. Elzinga was not deposed before trial and his
cross-examination at trial was perfunctory. As the briefs filed on appeal to
the Commission show, ENH is not contesting those findings on appeal and,
as a result, the case unfortunately does not present a vehicle for testing the
validity of the criticisms that the FTC has promoted.
EASING THE GOVERNMENT'S BURDEN

In 1966, in his famous dissent in United States v. Von's Grocery, Justice
Potter Stewart remarked that "[t]he sole consistency that I can find in litigation under [Section] 7, [is that] the Government always wins., 69 This became the call to arms for commentators such as then-Professors Richard
Posner and Robert Bork, who called for a more rigorous economic analysis
to support antitrust decisions. The effort to discredit the Elzinga-Hogarty
test undercuts the economic enlightenment movement. It is an undisguised
effort to lighten the agencies' burden. This would not be the first time the
agencies tried to rewrite the legal standards to ease their burden. For example, in United States v. Baker Hughes Inc., the DOJ argued that its prima
facie case challenging the merger of manufacturers of underground drilling
equipment could be overcome "only by a clear showing that entry into the
market by competitors would be quick and effective., 70 Then-Judge Clarence Thomas rejected this argument as an improper attempt to change the
standard:
We find no merit in the legal standard propounded by the government. It
is devoid of support in the statute, in the case law, and in the government's own Merger Guidelines. Moreover, it is flawed on its merits in
three fundamental respects. First, it assumes that ease of entry by competitors is the only consideration relevant to a section 7 defendant's rebuttal. Second, it requires that a defendant who seeks to show ease of en68.
69.
70.

Initial Decision, supra note 5, at 30-31 (emphasis added).
384 U.S. 270, 301 (1966).
United States v. Baker Hughes Inc., 908 F.2d 981, 983 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
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try bear the onerous burden of proving that entry will be"quick and effective." Finally, by stating that the defendant can rebut a prima facie
case only by a clear showing, the standard in effect shifts the government's ultimate burden of persuasion to the defendant.7 1
Similarly, discarding the Elzinga-Hogarty test entirely would be a step
backward. Admittedly, the test analyzes what patients have done in the recent past. Thus, any conclusion as to what they might do in the future is a
prediction. Yet that shortcoming was not part of the FTC's basis for discarding the test. The test has the virtue of being an empirical analysis -it
looks at real data that show what choices patients in the hospital setting
have actually made. Complaint Counsel suggested that patient choices
were not important because the focus should be on the competition for
MCO contracts. However, MCOs assemble networks of hospitals and physicians to be attractive to patients, and MCOs' preferences are derived from
the choices their members make. Therefore, even with an MCO-centered
focus, it does not make sense to ignore where patients choose to go. Determining where the patients have actually gone in the past provides a valuable check on any geographic market devised by other means.
THE QUESTIONABLE VALIDITY OF THE "SILENT MAJORITY FALLACY"

In his testimony, Elzinga declined to take credit for bestowing the "silent
majority fallacy" label on his test and cited Greg Werden as the originator
of that term.72 Of course, the term "silent majority" is borrowed from President Richard Nixon's famous "Silent Majority" speech delivered on November 3, 1969. 73 President Nixon suggested that the majority of the people supported his carrying on the Vietnam War and that the public should
disregard the vocal minority.74
The assertion that there is a "silent majority" of hospital patients who do
not travel is a generality that deserves a skeptical reception equal to its
Nixonian forebear. It is undoubtedly true that patients "travel" - i.e., go to
more distant hospitals-for a variety of reasons. Some may have done so to
be hospitalized closer to work, some to be nearer to family, some for perceived quality differences, some to obtain a service not available locally,
and some because of price--either because of the price they pay (through a
71.

Id.

72.

FTC v. ENH, Tr. May 25, 2005 at 2342-418.

73.

Richard Nixon, Address to the Nation (November 3, 1969), available at

http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/richardnixongreatsilentmajority.html.

74.

Id.
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co-pay or deductible), or because their chosen health plan steers them to the
more distant facility. The data can neither tell us why those that traveled
did so nor explain the motivations of those who did not. There is no empirical foundation to ascribe an aversion to travel to those who did not
travel. While packaged and delivered as the expert opinion of Werden and
Elzinga, this notion is nothing more than speculation and conjecture.
Whether the trick is performed by Werden, Elzinga, Nixon or the Amazing
Karnack, it has no scientific validity.
In its "Dose of Competition" Report, the DOJ and FTC asserted that
there was an empirical basis for the silent majority fallacy criticism of the
Elzinga-Hogarty test.75 However, that article makes clear that its methodology rests on "suppositions." A more concrete and legally relevant view of
the validity of the suggestion that patients will not travel can be found in the
opinion of the trial court in the Mercy Hospitalcase, where the DOJ alleged
a market that included "Dubuque County, Iowa and a half-circle with a 15
mile radius extending from Dubuque County's eastern edge into Illinois and
Wisconsin.', 76 The DOJ constructed this market based, in part, on the assumption that the majority of patients would not travel. The trial court
found otherwise:
The fact that the residents of southwest Wisconsin are willing to drive to
Madison for their inpatient needs also shows that the government's assumption that persons within twenty-five miles of Dubuque will only go
to Dubuque for their inpatient needs is an incorrect assumption. The government has also failed to account for the fact that there are several zip
codes within 25 miles of Dubuque which currently send over one-third of
their inpatients to other hospitals. Looking at the zip codes encompassing
Cuba City, Wisconsin; Galena, Illinois; New Vienna, Iowa; Potosi, Wisconsin; and Hazel Green, Wisconsin, there were 930 discharges in a six
month period from these zip codes and only 560 were discharged from
Mercy or Finley (60.2%). 179 of these discharges were to hospitals other
than Mercy, Finley, the seven rurals or the University of Iowa (19.2%).
Obviously, these persons
are already being attracted to hospitals outside
77
the immediate area.

75.
DOSE OF COMPETITION, supra note 44, at ch. 4, 9 (citing CORY CAPPS ET AL., THE
SILENT MAJORITY FALLACY OF THE ELZINGA-HOGARTY CRITERIA: A CRITIQUE AND NEW
APPROACH TO ANALYZING HOSPITAL MERGERS 1 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working

Paper No. w8216, 2001), availableat http://www.nber.org/papers/w8216).
76. United States v. Mercy Health Servs., 902 F. Supp. 968, 976 (N.D. Iowa 1995) vacated as moot, 107 F.3d 632 (8th Cir. 1997).
77. Id. at 979 (The appeal was dismissed as moot after the parties abandoned the transaction.).
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DEFINING THE GEOGRAPHIC MARKET WITHOUT DATA

Without data revealing where patients have actually gone in the past, the
enforcement agencies are free to offer a geographic market definition based
on less objective evidence. In light of the fact that the Merger Guidelines
employ the "the hypothetical monopolist test" to define markets, one might
expect the
enforcement agencies to turn to this test, but they have seldom
78
done so.
According to the Guidelines, the hypothetical monopolist test entails
starting with the merging firms and asking what would happen if a hypothetical monopolist imposed a small but significant and non-transitory increase on the price of relevant goods ("S.N.I.P."), assuming that the prices
and terms remained constant at other locations. 79 If, due to the price increase and the concomitant tendency for consumers within the identified region to seek services outside the region, the reduction in sales due to the
price increase was sufficiently large to render the price increase unprofitable, then the agency adds the next best substitute location to the proposed
location, and the test is repeated. 80 This theoretical construct is not helpful,
however, when it comes to presenting concrete empirical proof of the
boundaries of a real market.
The DOJ's economist in the Rockford Memorial case tried to use the
S.N.I.P. test by asking administrators of nearby hospitals whether they
would get more business if the two hospitals in Rockford (Rockford Memorial and SwedishAmerican) were to merge and, in collusion with the third
hospital in Rockford, raise prices "by a small but significant amount." 81
The trial court thought this approach did not produce probative evidence:
The government ran into trouble, however, when it attempted to question
the administrative heads of these hospitals on whether they "compete"
with the three Rockford hospitals.... Dr. Allen, the government's
economist, queried the administrators as to the effect of a hypothetical
price increase (usually 10 to 20%) in services offer[ed] by the three
Rockford hospitals. This approach was not without its difficulties. First,
the pricing of the same services between the three Rockford hospitals often differed by more than ten percent, creating doubt as to what was
meant by a 10% or 20% price increase in services offered by the Rock78. See Adventist Health System/West, 117 F.T.C. 224, 229 (1994) ("Instead of attempting to establish how Ukiah consumers of hospital services would respond to a small but nontransitory price increase, Complaint Counsel relied on expert testimony regarding the
Elzinga-Hogarty test.").
79. Merger Guidelines, supra note 24, at 41556.
80. Id.
81. United States v. Rockford Mem'l Corp., 717 F. Supp. 1251, 1263-64 (N.D. Ill.
1989).
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ford hospitals. Secondly, Dr. Allen did not employ a set routine in asking
the administrators the hypothetical "price question," also creating
doubt
82
as to the consistency of the questions and hence the answers.
The problem that the trial court in Rockford Memorial identified, which
is the inability to determine what is meant by a hospital's price because of
the range of different services a hospital provides, persists in all hospital
mergers. As ENH pointed out in its Appeal Brief to the Commission, a
83
typical hospital chargemaster has 15,000 to 20,000 individual line items.
Another method for defining geographic markets is the "critical loss"
analysis. The DOJ and FTC also disapproved of this methodology in their
"Dose of Competition" Report. 84 Ironically, the critical loss test is derived
from the Merger Guidelines' hypothetical monopolist test.8 5 The Merger
Guidelines direct the FTC to start with the location of each merging firm
and ask what would happen if a hypothetical monopolist imposed a small
but significant and non-transitory price increase, assuming prices and services remained constant at other locations. 86 The critical loss analysis involves calculating the percentage loss in sales that would make a given
price increase unprofitable for a hypothetical monopolist within a candidate
market. The first step in this analysis is to calculate the percentage loss in
sales that would make a hypothetical monopolist unprofitable within the
candidate market. 87 This step depends on the contribution margin, which is
a function of marginal cost. The next step in the critical loss analysis is to
estimate the likely actual loss in sales that would result from such a price
increase, asking what percentage of patients likely would stop patronizing
the hospitals in the candidate market as a result of the price increase.8 8 The
estimated actual loss is then compared to the calculated critical loss, and if
the estimated actual loss exceeds the critical loss, it is inferred that the price
increase would be unprofitable and the candidate market is too small to be a
market.8 9
The agencies disapproved of the critical loss analysis because it depends
on several variables, such as the marginal cost of services, which can be difficult to identify with any certainty. 90 According to the agencies, the calcu82. Id.
83. Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Corp., F.T.C. No. 9315 (Dec. 20, 2005) (respondent's appellate brief), http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9315/051220enhappealbrief.pdf.
84. See A DOSE OF COMPETITION, supra note 44, at ch. 4, 10-14.
85.
86.
87.

Id.
Id.
Id.

88.
89.

Id.
Id.

90.

See A DOSE OF COMPETITION, supra note 44, at ch. 4, 10-14.
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lation depends on the price posited and the contribution margin, which in
turn requires knowing the marginal cost. 9' As a result, the value of the
critical loss analysis is questionable because it depends on variables that are
difficult to accurately measure.

THE TRIANGLE

Instead of employing one of the analytical methodologies that focused on
patient travel, prices, or margins, Complaint Counsel argued that a geographic market could be determined using MCO preferences, basing this
case on the anecdotal testimony of MCO representatives who claimed that
they could not assemble a hospital network that excluded the three ENH
hospitals (Evanston, Glenbrook, and Highland Park).92 Complaint Counsel
argued that the hospitals faced "two-stage" competition. 93 First they competed to get an MCO to include them in the MCO's network, and, if successful, they also competed to get the MCO's members to come to their
hospital instead of another hospital in the MCO's network. Complaint
Counsel thus argued that the proper geographic market is the geographic
triangle formed by the three ENH hospitals.9 4
The AU did not agree. 95 He found that the geographic market consisted
of seven hospitals: the three ENH hospitals plus Lake Forest, Advocate Lutheran General, Rush North Shore, and St. Francis. 96 He also found that
this market was highly concentrated with an HHI of 2739, supporting a pre97
sumption that the merger created or enhanced market power.
The AU agreed with Complaint Counsel that the Elzinga-Hogarty test
should not be used, reasoning that it would "overstate" the geographic market.98 He adopted the "silent majority" rationale for disregarding the test
and also the "payor problem," which he described as follows:
217. The first problem with use of patient flow data and the ElzingaHogarty test is the "payor problem," which recognizes that in the hospital
industry, managed care organizations pay for hospital services but patients are the ones who use the services.

91.

Id.

92.
93.

See Initial Decision, supra note 5, at 31-33.
Id. at 16-18.

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at 137.
Id. at 143-44.
Id.
Id. at 200.
See Initial Decision, supra note 5, at 30-3 1.
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218. Because patients do not set the price of hospital services, their willingness to travel tells us 99
nothing about their sensitivity to price changes
by the merging hospitals.
This rejection of data on actual patient choice patterns left the AU with
the testimony of the MCO representatives. From their testimony he distilled the following principles: networks must include local hospitals; affluent consumers prize convenience and are less willing to travel; and ENH
and HPH are each other's main competitors.' 0 0 With regard to convenience,
the AU cited a survey that indicated consumers are willing to travel, on average, up to sixteen minutes for emergency care, twenty-eight minutes to a
primary care physician0 for routine care, and thirty-five minutes to a hospital
for an overnight stay.' '
On appeal to the Commission, Complaint Counsel argued that the ALJ's
02
geographic market was wrong. and reasserted their triangle market.1
ENH's counsel pointed out the illogic of both markets, which disregarded
eighteen hospitals that are closer to Evanston or HPH than those two are to
each other.
eIac other.os,

99
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102. Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Corp., F.T.C. No. 9315 (Dec. 20, 2005) (complaint counsel's answering and cross-appeal brief), http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9315/
060210Occattachrnntpursuantrule.pdf.
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To ground a determination of the geographic market principally on the
testimony of the MCO representatives is to rely on evidence of questionable
weight. The ex post testimony by MCO representatives that they "had" to
have the ENH hospitals in their networks was a subjective opinion given by
witnesses with interests adverse to the hospitals' and difficult to corroborate
based on any pre-merger objective evidence. The one exception would appear to be the testimony of One Health, which dropped ENH from its network, lost members, and later determined that it had to include ENH in its
network. 10 3 Cross-examination should have exposed the weakness of this
testimony. 104
The MCO witnesses, with one important exception, had a tale of woe as
to how they had been forced to accede to contracts with higher prices postmerger. 10 5 This post-merger evidence was used by the AU to confirm his
finding of the exercise of market power.'0 6
The AU concluded that the evidence demonstrated the following: that
the relevant product market was acute care inpatient services sold to MCOs;
that the relevant geographic market was the seven hospitals he identified;
and that, based on his calculation of a resulting HHI of 2739 and an increase of 384, the resulting market was highly concentrated., 07 This analysis supported an inference that the merged hospital had achieved market
power, which was confirmed by the post-merger pricing conduct.
The AL
08
rejected ENH's explanations attempting to rebut these findings.
THE DIRECT EFFECTS CASE
To meet its burden on Count Two, the FTC argued that the market definition step could be skipped entirely because in this case there was direct
evidence of anticompetitive effects. Count Two was an alternative theory
of liability that did not rely on predictions based on market concentration

103. Id. at 56.
104. FTC v. Tenet Health Care Corp., 186 F.3d 1045, 1054 (8th Cir. 1999) (reversing
the grant of an injunction to stop the hospital merger in Poplar Bluff, Missouri, the court was
much more skeptical about the weight to be afforded the testimony of MCO representatives,
stating, "[w]e question the district court's reliance on the testimony of managed care payers,
in the face of contrary evidence, that these for-profit entities would unhesitatingly accept a
price increase rather than steer their subscribers to hospitals in Sikeston or Cape Girardeau.
Without necessarily being disingenuous or self-serving or both, the testimony is at least contrary to the payers' economic interests and thus is suspect. In spite of their testimony to the
contrary, the evidence shows that large, sophisticated third-party buyers can and do resist
price increases, especially where consolidation results in cost savings to the merging entities.").
105. Initial Decision, supra note 5, at 52-58.
106. Id. at 47.
107. Id. at 1.
108. Id. at 200.
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data.' 0 9 In Count Two, Complaint Counsel argued that post acquisition evidence established that ENH exercised its enhanced post merger market
power by obtaining price increases significantly above its pre-merger prices
and in increments substantially above a comparison group of hospitals.'0
The AU dismissed Count Two as moot after finding for Complaint
Counsel on Count One."' Ironically, he reasoned that Complaint Counsel's
proof for Count Two was deficient because it did not allege and prove a
relevant market. 12 He pointed out that the paragraphs in the FTC's Complaint describing the market that the FTC alleged were not incorporated by
reference in Count Two. 1 3 Nevertheless, it is important to understand the
proof offered and the extent to which it is at variance with other merger
cases. On appeal, the Commission could only find for Complaint Counsel
on Count Two if it reversed the AU on the need to identify a market.
Complaint Counsel relied on four types of evidence to show that the
price increases were the result of an exercise of market power. 14 First, contemporaneous business records showed the hospitals' administrators and
their consultant were motivated to obtain "leverage" over MCOs to get better pricing. 15 Second, the MCO representatives claimed they had little or
no power to resist demands for price increases. 16 Third, a study was presented of the price increases, arguably showing that the magnitude of the
increases compared to price increases at other comparison hospitals reflected the exercise of market power.' Fourth, testimony from ENH employees tended to mirror themes from the business records and planning
documents that the merger was a path to increased market power."8
The first two types of proof are conventional. There is no question that
the administrators and their consultant, Bain & Co., described the merger as
an opportunity to gain "additional negotiating power and leverage with the
payors." 9 ENH's attempts at trial to explain these statements away were
not very persuasive. ENH claimed that, when it retained Bain in 1999 to
look at ENH's and HPH's MCO contracts as part of due diligence, it
learned that ENH's contracts were woefully below market and that it should
109. Administrative Complaint, supra note 18, at 5-7.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 201.
113. Id. at 200-01.
114. Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Corp., F.T.C. No. 9315 at 3-6 (May 27, 2005)
http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9315/050527
brief),
(complaint counsel's post-trial
ccposttrialbrief.pdf [hereinafter Complaint Counsel's Post-Trial Brief].
115. Id. at5-7.
116. Id. at 3-5.
117. Id. at 3.
118. Id. at 7.
119. Initial Decision, supra note 5, at 158.
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change its contracting methodology to get market prices and switch from
seeking to be in all networks to a more price conscious strategy.1 20 Unfortunately, ENH was saddled with an overabundance of swaggering statements that made the justifications offered at trial sound hollow.
As discussed above, the MCO representatives complained of being victimized by the powerful merged hospital.12 1 However, ENH did not succeed in raising prices with Blue Cross, the largest MCO with which it contracted, thus raising doubt about the ENH's alleged exercise of market
power. 122 After all, if ENH had market power, why was it unable to compel
Blue Cross to agree to higher reimbursement rates? This incongruity represented a gap in logic that Complaint Counsel had trouble explaining.
The centerpiece of the FTC's direct effects case was the study by Dr. Deborah Haas-Wilson, Professor of Economics at Smith College, who did an
empirical analysis of payment data.1 2 3 Dr. Haas-Wilson used four data
sources: payment data from the MCOs, the Universal dataset from the Illinois Department of Public Health, data from NERA (a consulting firm
working for ENH), and data from ENH in response to a Civil Investigative
Demand. 2 4 This study, like much of the record in the case, is heavily redacted because of a protective order that was designed to avoid disclosure
of specific MCO and hospital pricing, contractual terms, and payment
methodologies.1 25 This makes it difficult to evaluate the methodology she
employed in her study and her conclusions about the level of prices. Nevertheless, her analysis focused on whether ENH's price increases from its pre26
merger prices were greater than the price increases of other hospitals.
She concluded that price increases at ENH were larger than price increases
at comparison hospitals.1 27 She then looked to see whether
this difference could be explained by benign factors and determined that it
could not be, leading to her ultimate conclusion that the large price in1 28
creases were the result of an exercise of market power.

120. Id. at 170.
121. Id. at 52-59.
122. Administrative Complaint, supra note 18, at 7.
123. Initial Decision, supra note 5, at 61.
124. Id. at 61-62.
125. See id. at 65-74; see also Complaint Counsel's Post-Trial Brief, supra note 114.
126. Initial Decision, supra note 5, at 62.
127. Id. at 62, 65 (noting that comparing price increases is not the same as a comparison
of actual prices). See also FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066, 1076 (D. D.C. 1997)
(granting a preliminary injunction to the FTC barring the merger of two office supply superstores, Staples, Inc. and Office Depot, Inc., based on evidence that prices were higher in
markets where Staples was the only office supply superstore compared to markets where
there were three such stores by 5% or more).
128. Initial Decision, supra note 5, at 88-96.
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Complaint Counsel once again ventured off the beaten path. The study
did not seek to determine whether ENH was charging prices above competitive levels. In fact, as the AU found, Complaint Counsel conceded that the
question of whether ENH charged prices higher than competitive levels was
not the inquiry. 129 The failure to identify a competitive level of prices undermines the conclusion that the pricing study is supposed to support. If
ENH's prices before the merger were below the competitive level and if,
after the increases, they were at or below the competitive level, how can the
magnitude of the increase show an exercise of market power? The Guide"maintain
lines define market power as the power of a seller to profitably
' 130
time."
of
period
significant
a
for
levels
competitive
prices above
THE ZINGER
When the AU identified the other four hospitals in the geographic market, he made this observation:
It is highly probable that the four non-ENH hospitals in the geographic
market would have the ability to constrain prices at ENH, either now or
in the future, and could be utilized31by managed care organizations to create alternative hospital networks.1
This statement is a zinger. It completely contradicts the finding of market
power and exposes the conundrum presented by the AL's opinion. As
mentioned earlier, the injury to competition threatened by an illegal merger
can take one of two forms. The lessening of competition can facilitate collusion among the remaining firms or give a single firm the power to act unilaterally to raise price or exclude competitors. Here, the finding that the
four non-ENH hospitals can constrain ENH's future price increases would
appear to negate any possibility of unilateraleffects. Yet Complaint Counsel's theory was that the merger was illegal because of the unilateral effects,
as demonstrated by the price increases that ENH implemented. Nor can
Complaint Counsel fall back on coordinatedeffects. The proof presented in
Count Two was that ENH had raised prices, not that the other hospitals in
the market the ALJ identified did so in conjunction with ENH. In other
words, the direct effects evidence could only support a unilateral effects
theory, and could not support a coordinated effects theory.
PROGNOSIS

There are other issues presented in the ENH merger case that are not central to the inquiry of this article, but are substantial enough to merit some
129.
130.
131.

Id. at 155.
Merger Guidelines, supra note 24, at 41553.
Initial Decision, supra note 5, at 144.
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attention. One issue of considerable importance to ENH is whether divestiture is proper even if a violation is found. ENH has argued on appeal that it
is not and that a less restrictive remedy would suffice. Another issue is
whether the ALJ gave sufficient weight to ENH's defense of improved
quality of care. The ALJ found that ENH invested $120 million into HPH
but did not find that those improvements were merger-specific or justified
the price increases of ENH.
In trying to prognosticate how this case might be decided, the discussion
above shows that the structural case is weak and the record does not appear
to support a finding of a conventional market in which the merged hospitals
have a high market share. On the other hand, the price increases and leverage statements provide some evidence of power over price. However, the
zinger finding makes it difficult to hold the merger illegal under a unilateral
effects rationale. Furthermore, Blue Cross played the role of the "dog that
did not bark," further undercutting the market power argument.' 32 Overall,
the Commission would like to claim a victory to redeem its prosecution record. It also would like to validate its new analytical tools. Thus, it is conceivable that the finding of illegality will be confirmed based on the direct
evidence of price increases but that the decision will not order divestiture.
In other words, the Commission may craft a compromised decision that accomplishes the FTC's two goals without inviting a further appeal (which an
order of divestiture might do). The Commission would probably prefer to
avoid a further appeal. In addition, a Court of Appeals might be less accepting of the new analytical tools the FTC has promoted.
WHAT'S NEXT?

The ENH prosecution reveals some of the new weapons that the agencies
can be expected to use in future merger cases. Most future cases will not be
retrospective challenges 133 and thus there will not be many instances
whereevidence of direct anticompetitive effects is an issue. The ENH case
reveals some theories that hospital defendants should be prepared to address
in future mergers. These include:
132.

See SIR ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, Silver Blaze, in THE MEMOIRS OF SHERLOCK
22 (Harper & Brothers Publishers 1903) (1893). In this story about the murder of a
race horse's trainer, Holmes solves the case in part by deducing that The Scotland Yard detective's theory of the case did not fit:
Gregory (Scotland Yard detective): "Is there any other point to which you would wish to
draw my attention?"
Holmes: "To the curious incident of the dog in the night-time."
Gregory: "The dog did nothing in the night-time."
Holmes: "That was the curious incident."
133. See Antitrust Modernization Commission, Tentative Recommendations 5 (Jan. 11,
2007) (indicating that the recommendations are tentative), http://www.amc.gov/pdf/
meetings/listof recommendations_.janl 1v3.pdf.
HOLMES
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1.
Identify the pro-competitive rationale. Because the parties to a
merger are required to file their "4c" documents when they file their HartScott-Rodino pre-merger notification form, particular attention should be
paid to documents describing the purpose and intent of the transaction. The
process must be managed to make sure statements about the purpose of the
merger stay on message. The definition of 4c documents is:
All studies, surveys, analyses and reports which were prepared by or for
any officer(s) or director(s) for the purpose of evaluating or analyzing the
proposed affiliation with respect to market shares, competition, competitors, markets, potential for sales growth or expansion into product or
geographic markets.
At the earliest planning stages, it is important for the hospitals to identify
the reasons they are pursuing the transaction, to make sure that the procompetitive rationale is documented, and to make sure that statements implying anticompetitive motives are avoided. The FTC might never have
targeted ENH but for the statements of its administrators and consultants
implying that the purpose of the transaction was to gain leverage over
MCOs and to increase prices in managed care contracts. While a legal argument can always be made that statements of intent are irrelevant to the
structural analysis, a merger is easier to defend without that additional hurdle.
2.
Proselytize. Identify in the planning stages what constituencies
might object and design a strategy to enlist their support. ENH needlessly
confronted, and indeed virtually taunted, the MCOs. Had there been a
credible pro-competitive rationale--quality improvements, efficiencies, and
so on-MCOs might have been persuaded that they were going to reap the
benefits of these gains. Even if ENH was correct to believe its existing
MCO contracts were "below market," the timing and size of its increases
could have been moderated. The concerns of other constituencies, such as
physicians, suppliers, and consumer advocates, should similarly be addressed.
3.
Avoid inadvertent descriptions of the market or competitors that
overstate the hospital's market share or power in regularly generated reports. "Market" has a particular meaning in antitrust analysis, yet participants in the hospital industry sometimes use that word carelessly. Strategic
plans, board reports, Certificate of Need ("CON") applications, objections
to a competitor's CON application, and other internally generated documents often describe the supposed geographic market in which the hospital
competes, estimate its share of that market, identify its principal competitors, and estimate the market shares of those competitors. These descriptions may be appropriate for the analytical purpose of the given report.
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However, they can take on a life of their own when used for a different purpose and can cause mischief.
Document competitive initiatives. In the ENH case, the AL's Initial
4.
Decision seemed to describe a healthcare market that was lopsided, where
the hospitals had the whip hand. Only ENH appeared to be making contract
demands and initiating changes in reimbursement methodology. MCOs are
not powerless. The hospitals should document HMO mergers, contract
term changes, carve-outs, dropping hospitals or physicians from the network, employing stricter credentialing processes, etc.
Of course, the hospitals have to be aware of their own competitive initiatives. ENH participated in two prior attempts to consolidate with competing hospitals, and gaining leverage over MCOs was a stated reason in each
case. Bargaining positions and statements in MCO negotiations may be
seized upon as evidence confirming an expected misuse of market power.
The product market defined by the AU in this case assumes that MCOs
all want to contract for the full array of inpatient acute care offered by the
hospitals and that the MCOs were powerless to resist price increases because they had determined they had to have ENH in their networks. This
fails to recognize the power MCOs have to steer patients even within their
own networks. To what extent did any MCO steer patients for open heart
surgery away from a Chicago area network hospital and send them to the
Mayo Clinic, or other out of area providers, by designing financial incentives that promoted the use of a competing cardiac surgery program instead
of the local program? To what extent did any MCO threaten to send lab
work to a third party, carving it out of the hospital's contract? MCOs have
leverage from their ability to steer in this way that arguably neutralizes any
leverage of the merging hospitals. These episodes must be identified and
documented.
With the demise of CON laws and the expected growth of specialty hospitals, MCOs can be expected to "break the package" and not contract for
all the services a hospital offers. This strategy is aimed at obtaining better
pricing by carving out some services they would normally turn to full service hospitals to supply. The MCO may get better pricing on the carved
out service and it may get better contractual terms on the remaining services
through its negotiations with the hospital.
5.
Monitor communications with competitors. The coordinated effects
type of competitive injury posits collusive activity in the wake of a merger
that increases the market share of the merging parties. To what extent have
there been communications with competitors in the past and what has been
the tenor of those communications? Are there cooperative ventures? With
the advent of email, there may be communications on a wide array of subjects that might support an inference that coordination in the future is likely.
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6.
Rein in the consultants. The 4c documents and any second request
will harvest not only the documents of the merging parties, but also those of
their consultants and advisers. Mergers are often proposed by advisers who
use terms like "leverage" and "dominate" and express the objective of obtaining a "dominant market share" or "control over pricing." Statements
like these are magnets for further investigation by the enforcement agencies.
7.
Prepare the pro-competitive case and be prepared to disprove the unorthodox elements that the agencies are likely to employ in future challenges. Both the market definitions and the price analysis types of proof
should be anticipated, and a solid defense should be constructed showing
the weaknesses of both the economic theories and their application. If the
parties to a merger want to be sure that they can go forward with their
transaction, they should be prepared to take on the agencies in court (or before an AU), and they should prepare to litigate as soon as the possibility of
a challenge arises.
BLIND MEN AND THE ELEPHANT

The decision by the ALJ in the challenge to the ENH merger accomplished the two main goals of the FTC as set forth by former FTC Chairman
Muris. The FTC's Complaint Counsel has a scalp (for the moment), thus
stopping a losing streak and gaining the new analytical tools that have been
sanctioned by an ALJ. Nevertheless, the result is unsatisfactory. The markets that the FTC alleged, a product market of only the acute inpatient care
that is sold to MCOs and a three-hospital triangle geographic market, do not
describe an area of effective competition that most people in the hospital
industry would recognize. The analytical tools utilized to prove the case are
unorthodox and stray from those used in prior cases. The result does not fit
comfortably with the reality of this industry.
The product market, limited to services sold to MCOs, is a sliver of the
business that hospitals rely on for revenue. Hospitals also provide inpatient
care that is reimbursed by Medicare and Medicaid and they provide inpatient charity care. They also provide an extensive amount of outpatient
care. Simply put, no hospital provides inpatient acute care only to MCOs.
of the product market used to justify a
What does that say about the validity
134
challenge leading to divestiture?
The same can be said of the geographic market. The map of competing
hospitals makes it clear that there are many alternatives. Neither ENH nor
HPH, before the merger, would have described the market in which they
134. See United States v. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 983 F. Supp. 121, 137-39
(E.D.N.Y. 1997) (rejecting a product market defined as the bundle of inpatient services provided by anchor hospitals to managed care plans).
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competed as the triangle market of Complaint Counsel or the seven-hospital
market of the ALJ. Nor would the MCOs. At the end of the day, the prices
the FTC has complained about have not been shown to be above competitive levels. To rely on Complaint Counsel's study showing that ENH's
price increases were greater than other hospitals' increases in order to show
market power and its misuse is akin to a three cushion billiard shot.'3 5
Hospitals today face competition from a growing list of competitors.
Physicians can and do perform tests in their offices. There are freestanding
labs. There are independent imaging centers. The number of specialty hospitals is growing. In an age when people routinely have one-hour commutes from home to work, constructing a geographic market based on sixteen-minute driving times from home seems contrary to reality.
Chairman Muris started off in the right direction when he proposed a
study of past hospital transactions that would demonstrate whether transactions challenged in the past resulted in anticompetitive effects.' 36 No such
study has ever been released. This leaves observers wondering whether
there is a valid basis for the merger tools now being advocated as appropriate to measure hospital mergers. The ENH case may not resolve the issues.
Can the analytical tools that the FTC employs give it a clear picture of
hospital competition? Or, has the FTC, through its ENH decision, compelled future courts and ALJs to operate like
the Blind Men who "prate
37
seen."'
has
them
of
one
not
Elephant
an
about
135. Three cushion billiard is one of the most difficult variants of billiards requiring the
cue ball to carom off the first object ball and then strike three cushions before striking the
second object ball.
136. See Muris, supra note 2.
137. John Godfrey Saxe's poem "The Blind Men and the Elephant," is based on an old
Indian fable:
It was six men of Indostan
To learning much inclined
Who went to see the Elephant
(Though all of them were blind),
That each by observation
Might satisfy his mind
The First approached the Elephant,
And happening to fall
Against his broad and sturdy side,
At once began to bawl:
"God bless me! But the Elephant
Is very like a wall!"
The Second, feeling of the tusk,
Cried, "Ho! What have we here
So very round and smooth and sharp?
To me 'tis mighty clear
This wonder of an Elephant
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Is very like a spear!"
The Third approached the animal,
And happening to take
The squirming trunk within his hands,
Thus boldly up and spake:
"I see," quoth he, "the Elephant
Is very like a snake!"
The Fourth reached out an eager hand,
And felt about the knee.
"What most this wondrous beast is like
Is mighty plain," quoth he;
"'Tis clear enough the Elephant
Is very like a tree!"
The Fifth, who chanced to touch the ear,
Said: "E'en the blindest man
Can tell what this resembles most;
Deny the fact who can
This marvel of an Elephant
Is very like a fan!"
The Sixth no sooner had begun
About the beast to grope,
Than, seizing on the swinging tail
That fell within his scope,
"I see," quoth he, "the Elephant
Is very like a rope!"
And so these men of Indostan
Disputed loud and long,
Each in his own opinion
Exceeding stiff and strong,
Though each was partly in the right,
And all were in the wrong!
Moral:
So oft in theologic wars,
The disputants, I ween,
Rail on in utter ignorance
Of what each other mean,
And prate about an Elephant
Not one of them has seen!
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